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Abstract  In his essay ‘“Wang’s Paradox”’, Crispin Wright proposed a solution to the 
Sorites Paradox (in particular, the form of it he calls the ‘Paradox of Sharp Boundaries’) that involves 
adopting intuitionistic logic when reasoning with vague predicates.  He does not give a semantic theory 
which accounts for the validity of intuitionistic logic (and the invalidity of stronger logics) in that area.  The 
present essay tentatively makes good the deficiency.  By applying a theorem of Tarski, it shows that 
intuitionistic logic is the strongest logic that may be applied, given certain semantic assumptions about 
vague predicates.  The essay ends with an inconclusive discussion of whether those semantic assumptions 
should be accepted. 
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Crispin Wright’s papers and books have for forty years been read and admired by philosophers throughout 
the world.  He has made, and continues to make, important contributions to debates about vagueness, rule-
following, realism, scepticism, self-knowledge, the philosophy of mathematics, and the interpretation of 
Wittgenstein.  Just as impressive, to those of us who know him personally, are Wright’s qualities as a 
philosophical interlocutor.  Whether in public discussion or private conversation he is quick on the uptake, 
acute in response, and seemingly incapable of descending to the footling or trivial.  One’s understanding of 
a philosophical issue is always deepened by debating it with him. 
It is his passion for philosophical debate that led him to found two institutions that have 
contributed so much to philosophy in Britain and abroad.  Philosophers would make the journey to the 
Arché Centre at St Andrews, and more recently to the Northern Institute of Philosophy at Aberdeen, in 
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large part to get the benefit of his reaction to their ideas.  The creation of those institutions bears witness to 
further qualities that are rarely found combined with philosophical distinction: considerable social and 
administrative energy, and an unquenchable optimism no matter how difficult the times. 
It was Wright’s essay ‘On the Coherence of Vague Predicates’ (1975) that first won him a wide 
readership, and his subsequent papers on vagueness have also made waves.  I have no space to survey his 
work in that area, but one of his recent essays on the topic provides my point of departure.  In ‘“Wang’s 
Paradox”’,\1/ his contribution to the Library of Living Philosophers volume that honoured our common 
teacher, the late Sir Michael Dummett, Crispin Wright presents the most powerful argument I know in 
favour of the thesis that we should employ intuitionistic logic, not classical logic, when reasoning with 
vague concepts.\
2
/  For reasons that will emerge, I am not convinced that this thesis is true, but neither am I 
convinced that it is false.  The aim of this paper, which I confess is inconclusive, is to bring into the debate 
some considerations which ought to inform any eventual decision on the question. 
 
 
1. Wright’s Paradox of Sharp Boundaries 
 
The tangled skein that is the Sorites contains several distinct threads.  A proper exploration of these and of 
their relations is impossible here, but one of Wright’s contributions has been to focus attention on a form of 
the paradox that is especially stark and difficult to solve.  The discussion in this essay is confined to this 
version of the problem. 
Let us suppose that we have a sequence of a hundred transparent tubes of paint, a1,…, a100, with 
the following properties: tube a1 is clearly red; tube a100 is clearly orange and hence clearly not red; but for 
each n, tube an+1 is only marginally more orange (and hence only marginally less red) than its predecessor 
                                                 
1
  The topic of Wright’s essay is not Wang’s Paradox per se, but rather Dummett’s paper ‘Wang’s Paradox’ 
(Dummett 1975), hence the quotation marks in Wright’s title. 
 
2
  The idea that intuitionistic logic might help with the paradoxes of vagueness was floated by Hilary 
Putnam in his ‘Vagueness and Alternative Logic’ (Putnam 1983).  Stephen Read and Crispin Wright (1985) 
sharply criticized what they took to be Putnam’s view, but Putnam (1985) protested that they had misread 
him.  Wright’s paper of 2007 may be read as developing the approach to the Sorites that Putnam had 
floated in 1983 and then presented more clearly in 1985.  See also n.4 below. 
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an.  Indeed, let us suppose that an observer with good eyesight, when viewing any pair of adjacent tubes an 
and an+1 together in white light but without comparing them with other tubes, is unable to perceive any 
difference in colour between them.  That is, we suppose that any two adjacent members of the sequence are 
indiscriminable in colour.  In such a case, the claim that nowhere in the sequence is a red tube immediately 
followed by a non-red tube seems highly plausible.  For if there were a number N for which aN were red 
while aN+1 were not, we would have a pair of tubes which are indiscriminable in colour but where one 
member is red while the other is not red; this seems to conflict with the correct use of the predicate ‘red’.\3/  
In a semi-formalized language, then, it seems that we may affirm: 
 
 (1) n (an is red  (an+1 is red)). 
 
In the situation described, however, we also have 
 
 (2) a1 is red 
 
and 
 
 (3) (a100 is red).  
 
Now if we suppose 
 
(4) a99 is red 
 
then the rule of conjunction-introduction applied to (3) and (4) would yield 
                                                 
3
  Wright’s leading example in his 2007 paper is a Sorites for ‘looks red’ rather than ‘is red’.  It is perhaps 
even clearer that the correct use of ‘seems red’ precludes the existence of a pair of indiscriminable tubes, 
one of which seems red while the other does not.  However, claim (1) is also highly plausible, and the 
logical issues I want to address arise equally with ‘is red’, which is why I have switched to the semantically 
simpler predicate. 
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(5) a99 is red  (a100 is red), 
 
which, by -introduction, yields 
 
 (6) n (an is red  (an+1 is red)) 
 
which directly contradicts (1).  Given (1) and (3), then, supposition (4) stands refuted, so by Reductio we 
may assert 
 
 (7) (a99 is red). 
 
By repeating this inferential sub-routine a further 98 times, we reach 
 
 (8) (a1 is red) 
 
which contradicts (2).  This, then, is the initial paradox.  We have some reason to accept the trio of 
postulates (1), (2), and (3), but we also have an apparently valid deduction showing that the trio is 
inconsistent.  It may be noted that the form of Reductio that is applied in reaching line (7)—and that is re-
applied at the corresponding later steps—is acceptable to an intuitionist.  So the trio comprising (1), (2), 
and (3) is inconsistent in intuitionistic logic as well as in classical logic. 
How should we react to this apparent demonstration of inconsistency?  Since the case is one in 
which (2) and (3) are clearly true, it seems that we must take it as showing that (1) is false.  In other words, 
we would appear to be entitled—indeed, compelled if the question of (1)’s truth arises—to make a further 
application of the relevant form of Reductio and infer the negation of (1), namely, 
 
 (9) n (an is red  (an+1 is red)). 
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In classical logic, however, (9) is equivalent to 
 
 (10) n (an is red  (an+1 is red)). 
 
This, however, seems to land us in a yet more acute paradox, one that Crispin Wright has called the 
Paradox of Sharp Boundaries.  For formula (10) says that at some point in the sequence a red tube is 
immediately followed by a non-red tube, and this seems to ascribe a sharp boundary to the concept red.  
Some philosophers take the vagueness of a predicate to consist in there not being a sharp boundary between 
those objects that satisfy it and those objects that do not.  But even if the absence of a boundary is not 
constitutive of vagueness, it still seems absurd to say that one tube is red while a tube indiscriminable in 
colour from it is not red: little wonder that Wright calls formula (10) the ‘Unpalatable Existential’. 
Yet we have deduced this apparent absurdity by applying the rules of classical logic to the indisputably true 
premisses (2) and (3). 
One initial comment about the argument is in order.  Although I have used an existential quantifier 
in formulating premiss (1) and some subsequent lines of the argument, its employment is entirely 
dispensable.  Since the quantifier ranges over the natural numbers from 1 to 100, one could replace any 
statement of the form ‘n (n)’ by the corresponding disjunction ‘(1)  …  (100)’.  Thus a 
propositional logic—indeed, a logic of negation, conjunction, and disjunction—suffices to assess the 
validity of the argument. 
The apparent antinomy here has long been a source of scepticism about the applicability of 
classical logic to deductions involving vague terms, but it is worth distinguishing between two sorts of 
sceptic.  Some hold that the laws of some other logical system codify the standards for assessing the 
validity of those deductions, while others take a more radical position and deny that such assessments admit 
of codification at all.  Among the radicals was Frege.  On his view, statements can stand in law-governed 
logical relations only if each of their component expressions possesses a reference or Bedeutung.  The 
reference of a predicate is a concept or Begriff.  And yet: 
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A concept that is not sharply defined is wrongly termed a concept.  Such quasi-conceptual 
constructions cannot be recognized as concepts by logic; it is impossible to lay down precise laws 
for them.  The law of excluded middle is really just another form of the requirement that the 
concept should have a precise boundary (Frege 1902 §56, p.69). 
 
A few years earlier, he had elaborated the same message in a letter to Peano: 
 
Logic can only recognize sharply delimited concepts.  Only under this presupposition can it set up 
precise laws…Just as it would be impossible for geometry to set up precise laws if it tried to 
recognize threads as lines and knots in threads as points, so logic must demand sharp boundaries 
of what it will recognize as a concept unless it wants to renounce all precision and certainty (Frege 
1896, 182-3 = Frege 1980, 114-5). 
 
Indeed, Frege diagnoses the Sorites as arising from the application of precise laws to ‘quasi-conceptual 
constructions’: ‘The fallacy known as the Sorites rests on this: that something (for example, heap) is treated 
as a concept when logic cannot acknowledge it as such because it is not properly circumscribed’ (Frege 
1897/8, 165 = Frege 1979, 155). 
 
 
2. Intuitionism as the logic of vagueness 
 
Unlike Frege, Wright does not despair of finding a precise logic for vague reasoning.  On his view, though, 
the logic in question is intuitionistic, not classical (see especially Wright 2007, but also his 2001 and 2003).  
He reaches this conclusion through a close analysis of the paradoxical argument. 
As remarked above, the derivation showing that (1), (2) and (3) form an inconsistent trio is 
intuitionistically correct; Wright duly accepts that derivation.  He further accepts that the statements (2) and 
(3) are true, so that the derivation shows that (1) is false.  But he insists that that conclusion is acceptable.  
We are tempted to assert (1) because we think we know that there is no sharp cut-off between the red 
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members of the sequence and the non-red members.  But really, we do not know any such thing.  In order 
to assert (1)—i.e., in order to assert that there is no sharp cut-off—we would require an insight into the 
semantics of the predicate ‘red’—i.e., an understanding of the way it contributes to the determination of the 
truth or falsity of statements containing it—that we do not (yet) possess.  Of course, we are equally unable 
to assert that there is any sharp cut-off point between the red and the non-red tubes in our sequence, but 
lack of entitlement to assert should not be confused with entitlement to deny.  On a correct view, Wright 
claims, a predicate’s ‘vagueness…does not consist in the absence of sharp cut-offs’; rather, it consists in 
there being ‘nothing in our practice with the predicate that grounds the claim that there is a sharp cut-off’ 
(Wright 2007, 439).  In particular, where we have a simple statement in which a vague predicate is applied 
to one of its borderline cases, 
 
the breakdown in convergence of verdicts leaves us without uncontroverted evidence for its truth 
or for the truth of its negation.  Since we lack convincing theoretical grounds to think that one or 
the other must be true nonetheless—because such grounds would have to regard the determinants 
of truth and falsity as constituted elsewhere than in our linguistic practice—we are left with no 
compelling reason to regard either [the statement] or its negation as true (Wright op. cit., 441). 
 
Let us pick a tube from the middle of our sequence—a50, say.  That tube, we may suppose, is a borderline 
case of redness: even given full information about its colour, and full information about how competent 
English speakers are disposed to use the predicate ‘red’, it remains indeterminate whether the predicate 
correctly applies to the tube.  On Wright’s view, we should refrain both from asserting and from denying 
‘Tube a50 is red’.  Similarly, he thinks, we should refrain both from asserting and from denying ‘Some red 
tube in the sequence is immediately followed by a non-red tube’—that is, we should refrain both from 
asserting and from denying formula (10).  In particular, then, we should refrain from denying (10); 
equivalently, we should refrain from asserting (1). 
What, though, of the second part of the paradoxical argument?  As remarked, (1), (2) and (3) are 
(intuitionistically) inconsistent, and premisses (2) and (3) are clearly true.  So it seems that (1) is false.  But 
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if (1) is false, then its negation is true.  So we are entitled to assert—indeed, we are committed to 
asserting—(9): 
 
(9) n (an is red  (an+1 is red)). 
 
Wright accepts (9).  Because (1)—the denial that red has a sharp cut-off point—contradicts the evident 
truths (2) and (3), we must be prepared to deny any denial that there is a sharp cut-off point.  Assuming that 
denying a statement is equivalent to affirming its negation, it follows that we must be prepared to affirm the 
doubly negated formula (9).  However, in order to reach the genuinely unpalatable (10), which asserts that 
there is a sharp cut-off between the red and the non-red tubes, we would need to eliminate a double 
negation.  And this, Wright argues, we are neither compelled nor entitled to do.  Since we cannot assume 
that statements involving vague expressions are either true or false, ‘we should…abstain from unrestricted 
use of the law of double negation elimination’ (ibid.).  Such abstention enables us consistently to deny (1), 
assert (9), but refrain from asserting or denying (10).  This combination of assertions, denials, and 
abstentions from assertion and denial constitutes, Wright proposes, a coherent response both to the Sorites 
proper and to the related Paradox of Sharp Boundaries.\
4
/ 
We have here a novel and interesting argument for intuitionistic logic.  Pace Frege, there is a logic 
for assessing deductions involving vague predicates, but the logic in question is intuitionistic rather than 
classical.  If it works at all, Wright’s argument has very wide application.  Many ordinary predicates are 
such that nothing in our ordinary practice with them grounds the claim that their extensions have sharp cut-
offs.  For many of those predicates, indeed, it will be possible to construct a Sorites sequence.  To those 
predicates, Wright’s argument will apply: on pain of contradicting clear truths, we must deny that there is 
no sharp cut-off point, whilst resisting the unsupported assertion that there is such a cut-off.  This position 
                                                 
4
  The kernel of Wright’s position, then, is to deny the denial of (10) while refraining from either asserting 
or denying (10) itself.  This is why I read Wright’s essay of 2007 as elaborating the position Putnam took in 
1985:  ‘In my proposal (10) is not denied.  What the Read-Wright argument does show, in fact, is that I 
should deny (10)’s denial—that is, I should accept the double negation of (10)’ (Putnam 1985, 203, with 
re-numbering of formulae).  The double negation of (10) is (9) which, as we have seen, Wright does accept 
in his 2007 paper. 
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is stable only if there are restrictions on the elimination of double negations; so we have an argument in 
favour of a logic (like intuitionistic logic) which imposes such restrictions. 
What should we make of this argument?  In his reply to ‘“Wang’s Paradox”’, Michael Dummett 
put on record his ‘admiration for the beautiful solution of the Sorites advocated by Crispin Wright, clouded 
by a persistent doubt whether it is correct’ (Dummett 2007a, 453).  Anyone who appreciates logico-
philosophical finesse will share Dummett’s admiration for an ingenious proposal, but there are, indeed, two 
immediate reasons to doubt its correctness. 
First, Wright moves too quickly from the observation that we hesitate when pressed to say 
whether a borderline red-orange object is red, to what is really needed to sustain the distinction the 
intuitionist wishes to draw between (9) and (10).  The observation is correct, and if one further supposes 
that the only possible grounds for the truth of a vague statement must be overt in our ordinary practices of 
asserting and denying it, then it cannot be assumed that an atomic statement in which a vague predicate is 
applied to one of its borderline cases is either true or false.  This point, however, is not immediately 
relevant to the status of the formulae (9) and (10).  These formulae are not atoms, and (on intuitionistic 
principles) we may assert that a complex statement is bivalent even when we cannot assert the bivalence of 
any of its components.\
5
/  So we need a further argument to show that we cannot assert the bivalence of (9) 
and (10). 
Wright seems to have in mind a traditional Heyting-style semantics for the language of 
intuitionism on which truth goes with assertibility and bivalence goes with decidability.\
6
/  Under that 
semantics, the existentially quantified formula (10) may be assumed to be bivalent if (a) the relevant 
domain of quantification is surveyable, and (b) each matrix instance is decidable.  Condition (a) is surely 
met.  In a Sorites deduction, the relevant sequence of objects is finite; indeed, as noted, the deduction 
would go through in essentially the same way if (10) were replaced by a disjunction.  So Wright must deny 
that all the matrix instances of (10) are decidable; in particular, he must deny that we have a general ground 
                                                 
5
  For example, an intuitionist is always entitled to assert the falsity, and hence the bivalence, of 
(A  A), whatever the status of A. 
 
6
  See especially the discussion on p.441 of Wright 2007, which concludes: ‘We should therefore abstain 
from unrestricted use of the law of double negation elimination.  We do so on the grounds that it is 
nonconservative of knowledge—exactly the Intuitionistic reservation’. 
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for denying any formula of the form ‘an is red  (an+1 is red)’.  For, in a Heyting-style semantics, such a 
ground would render (10) false, so we would have a proof of (1), as well as of (9), and Wright’s way out of 
paradox would collapse back into contradiction.  The problem is that there is a plausible general ground for 
denying any such conjunction—namely, Timothy Williamson’s thesis that knowledge of inexact matters 
demands margins for error (Williamson 1994, 226-30).  According to that thesis, knowledge that an is red 
requires that an+1 may also be red, for all we know; this excludes knowledge that an+1 is not red.  Since 
Wright takes it that an entitlement to assert requires knowledge, Williamson’s thesis provides a general 
ground for rejecting any assertion of the form ‘an is red  (an+1 is red)’.  On Heyting’s principles, this 
would amount to a ground for denying (i.e., affirming the negation of) any such conjunction.  This is turn 
yields a ground for deeming (10) to be false, which is inconsistent with Wright’s claim that its negation, 
(1), is also false.  If he wishes to persist with a Heyting-style semantics, Wright badly needs to dispel the 
considerable attractions of the thesis that inexact knowledge demands margins for error, for that thesis 
brings his position into ruin.\
7
/ 
Second, and more importantly, Wright’s suggestion that the logic of vague statements is 
intuitionistic is not sustained by any detailed semantic analysis.  He points to broad analogies between the 
intuitionists’ attitude to mathematical statements and the attitude that he recommends taking towards vague 
statements: in each case, statements’ ‘truth and falsity have to be thought of as determined by our very 
practice, rather than by principles which notionally underlie’ that practice.\8/  As Dummett has remarked, 
however, it is most implausible to suppose that the Heyting semantics for the language of intuitionist 
mathematics correctly describes the contribution that the connectives and quantifiers make to the meaning 
of vague statements: 
                                                 
7
  This thesis about knowledge does not entail Williamson’s own epistemicism about vagueness—the claim 
that there is a sharp cut-off point in the sequence of red things, but that we cannot in principle know where 
it is.  Someone who denies, or refrains from accepting, that there is a sharp cut-off can still hold that 
knowledge that such-and-such an object is red requires a margin for error. 
 
8
  Wright 2007, 441.  One of Wright’s theses in his essay is that competence with a word like ‘red’ is not 
underpinned or informed by adherence to any rule.  If that thesis is correct, then a semantic theorist cannot 
sensibly aim to articulate the rules that govern competence with ‘red’.  But in calling for a more detailed 
semantic analysis than Wright provides, I am not asking for that, but only for something that it is 
reasonable to seek on any plausible view.  For the predicates ‘is not red’, ‘is either red or orange’, etc. are 
clearly semantically complex, so it must be in order to ask for a statement of the general principles that 
relate their meanings to the meanings of their components.  That is what I mean by a semantic analysis. 
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Wright can hardly say that to grasp the meaning of the statement [‘This curtain is red’, said of a 
borderline red-orange curtain] is to be able to recognize a demonstration that the colour of the 
curtain is red, not orange, or that it is orange, not red.  Presumably he must say that it consists in 
an ability to judge that the colour of the curtain is neither definitely red nor definitely orange, but 
is definitely either one or the other.  If so, however, the theory of meaning for vague statements on 
which Wright wishes to rest intuitionist logic as applying to them interprets disjunction quite 
differently from the intuitionist theory of meaning for mathematical statements (Dummett 2007, 
451-2). 
 
As we shall soon have occasion to note, Heyting’s is far from being the only semantic theory that sustains 
intuitionistic logic, but Dummett’s general point remains: ‘It is not enough to show that the Sorites paradox 
can be evaded by the use of intuitionistic logic; what is needed is a theory of meaning, or at least a 
semantics, for sentences containing vague expressions that shows why intuitionistic logic is appropriate for 
them rather than any other logic’ (op. cit., 453). 
Wright might, I suppose, contest the need for a semantic theory.  At least, he might argue that the 
construction of such a theory is not needed to vindicate his use of intuitionistic logic.  We are dealing, after 
all, with a paradox: statements involving vague terms which we are disposed to assert yield contradictions 
given classical logic, but they do not yield absurdities when the operative logic is intuitionistic.  One might 
reasonably think that this fact provides strong reason for restricting some classical laws even in advance of 
constructing a semantic theory.  Indeed, Wright might pray in aid some of Dummett’s own writings here.  
At the end of the chapter in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics which presents his reasons for adopting 
intuitionistic logic, Dummett remarks that ‘the meanings of the intuitionistic logical constants can be 
explained in a very direct way, without any apparatus of semantic theory, in terms of the use made of them 
in practice’ (Dummett 1991, 299).  ‘A metalanguage whose underlying logic is intuitionistic’, he goes on, 
‘can be understood, and its logical laws acknowledged, without appeal to any semantic theory and with 
only a very general meaning-theoretical background.  If that is not the right logic, at least it may serve as a 
medium by means of which to discuss other logics’ (op. cit., 300).  The ‘very general meaning-theoretical 
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background’ to which Dummett refers includes the requirement of ‘harmony’ between the introduction and 
elimination rules for a connective.  Wright might fairly point out that the requirement of avoiding outright 
contradiction is more clearly compelling than that of harmony, and that the former requirement is all he 
really needs to press his case for intuitionistic logic as the ‘right logic’ when reasoning with vague terms. 
For all that, a semantic theory remains desirable: it may help us to understand why the distinctively 
classical rules are invalid when applied to vague terms.  As Dummett was wont to say in the rather different 
context of the foundations of mathematics, to observe that a certain postulate leads to contradiction is to 
‘wield the big stick’ when what is really wanted is some explanation of why the postulate is troublesome.  
In this paper, I want to take up Dummett’s challenge and construct a semantic theory for vague terms which 
offers some hope of vindicating intuitionism as the logic of vagueness.  I am not sure that the semantic 
theory I propose is fully satisfactory; indeed, §5 will present some reasons for doubting it.  Those reasons, 
however, are far from conclusive, and it would be interesting to know whether Crispin Wright is disposed 
to accept it.  If he were, it would give him a way of meeting Dummett’s challenge head on by showing why 
intuitionistic logic, rather than any other logic, sets the standards for assessing deductive arguments 
involving vague terms. 
 
 
3. A semantics for vague predicates that validates intuitionistic logic 
 
The semantic theory I have in mind is really nothing more than an application of a theorem of Alfred 
Tarski’s. 
Topologists have the notion of an open set.  The mark of such a set is that, whenever an object 
belongs to it, there is a ‘neighbourhood’ around the object, all of whose members also belong to the set.  
Suppose we have a domain which comprises all the possible coloured objects, not merely those that 
actually exist.  Then it is very natural to postulate that the set of red objects in this domain will be open in a 
suitably defined topology.  For suppose that a possible object x is red.  Then it is natural to postulate that 
there is a neighbourhood of possible objects around x that are also red.  An object’s perceived colour does 
not depend only on the wavelength of the light it reflects or emits: it also depends on the ambient 
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illumination and on the colours of nearby objects.  All the same, if our red object, x, reflects light of 
wavelength 700 nm, then it is plausible to claim that all the possible objects which are observed in the same 
context as x and in circumstances where human colour perception is as it actually is, but which reflect light 
of wavelengths between 699 and 701 nm, will also be red.  In a suitably defined topology, then, these 
possible objects will constitute a neighbourhood around x, all of whose members are also red.  An object 
that reflects light of 700 nm is a paradigm case of redness, but the argument may be adapted to show that 
there is a neighbourhood around any red object.  Suppose that y is a red object that reflects light of 620 nm, 
and so is close in colour to some orange objects.  Even assuming that colour perception is as it actually is, it 
may well be that some possible objects that reflect light of wavelengths between 619 and 621 nm are not 
red.  However, so long as y is red, it is plausible to claim that there is some neighbourhood around y—for 
example, those possible objects that are viewed in the same context as y but which reflect light of 
wavelengths between 619.9999 and 620.0001 nm—all of whose members are red.  This smaller 
neighbourhood is enough to ensure that the set of red objects in the domain is open.  It is also natural to 
postulate that the set of possible objects that are not red will be another open set in the same topology.  For 
if z is a possible object that is not red, perhaps because it reflects light of only 550 nm, it is plausible to 
claim that all the possible objects which are viewed in the same context as z, but which reflect light of 
wavelengths between 549 and 551 nm, are also not red. 
Arguments analogous to that just sketched may be advanced for many vague predicates.  Suppose 
that x is a tall man in the domain of all possible men.  Then, whatever precise height x has, it is plausible to 
claim that there is a neighbourhood around x all of whose members are also tall men.  If x is close to the 
borderline for being tall, the members of the neighbourhood may have a precise height that is very close to 
x’s.  All the same, the set of tall possible men will be open in an appropriately defined topology.  So will 
the set of possible men who are not tall. 
We cannot assume that the set of actual men who are tall is open in the relevant topology.  
Suppose that every man of height greater than 58 dies, except for one man, Adam, whose height is 61.  
Adam is tall, but in the circumstance envisaged there is no neighbourhood of actual tall men around him.  
All the same, it is entirely natural to take account of merely possible existents when giving a semantic 
theory for predicates.  This is certainly the case when we are concerned with logical relations between 
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statements and predicates.  When a conclusive statement follows logically from some premiss statements, it 
is logically necessary that it is true whenever they are all true.  Similarly, when a conclusive predicate 
follows logically from some premiss predicates, it is logically necessary that it is true of whatever they are 
all true of.  Given that, it is natural to take the semantic value of a predicate to be a subset of a domain of all 
logically possible objects, not merely the actual ones.  This raises, of course, the vexed question of how we 
might best conceive of that domain, but there is a way of bracketing that question for present purposes.  
Rather than taking the semantic value of ‘tall’ to be a subset of the domain of all possible men, we might 
take it to be a set of specific heights, determined by a real number (with ‘foot’ as the unit, say): a man will 
be tall if his specific height belongs to this set.  Since a specific height will exist even if no man has that 
height, this semantic value of ‘tall’ will be an open set regardless of men’s heights.  This manoeuvre also 
enables to be specific about the topology in question: on this approach, the semantic value of ‘tall’ is an 
open set in the standard topology on the real line.  Similarly, we may take the semantic value of ‘red’ to be 
an open set in the same topology, where the real numbers in this case specify wavelengths of reflected or 
emitted light.  An object may be said to be ‘red’ if it reflects or emits light of a wavelength belonging to 
this semantic value.  These assignments of semantic values are of course idealized.  No determinate set of 
real numbers, whatever its topological properties, contains the heights (in feet) of all and only tall men; and 
an object’s perceived colour depends on the ambient illumination and the colours of nearby objects as well 
as on the wavelengths of light it emits or reflects.  But all the semantic theories we currently have involve 
considerable idealization and (as we shall see) the present idealization leads to very different results from 
the familiar one, which postulates sharp boundaries even for vague predicates such as ‘red’ and ‘tall’. 
How might these ruminations about open sets encourage a theorist who recommends using 
intuitionistic logic when assessing deductive arguments involving vague terms?  Where S is any topological 
space, and L is any propositional language whose connectives are ‘’, ‘’, ‘’, and ‘’, let us say that a 
map v is an interpretation of L into S if v maps each well-formed formula of L into an open subset of S in 
such a way that 
 
 v(A  B) = v(A)  v(B) 
 v(A  B) = v(A)  v(B) 
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 v(A  B) = Int (v(B)  (S – v(A))) 
and v(A) = Int (S – v(A)). 
 
(Thus v(A) = v(A  ), where v() = .)  The interior Int (X) of a set X is the largest open set contained 
in X.  Accordingly, the clauses for the conditional and for negation ensure that a conditional or negated 
formula is mapped into an open set in S.  Since the intersection and union of two open sets are also open, v 
maps every statement in L to an open set in S.  Let us then say that an argument ‘A1,…, An; so B’ in L is 
valid in the topological space S if and only if 
 
for every interpretation v of L into S, v(A1)  …  v(An)  S  v(B). 
 
Let us define a consequence relation A1,…, An╞Top B as one which obtains when the argument ‘A1,…, An; so 
B’ is valid in every topological space.  A theorem due to Tarski—the Second Principal Theorem of his 
paper ‘Sentential Calculus and Topology’ (1938, 448)—then tells us that the intuitionistic propositional 
calculus is sound and complete with respect to this notion of consequence.  That is, where ├Int signifies 
deducibility by the rules of the intuitionistic propositional calculus, 
 
(A) A1,…, An├Int B if and only if A1,…, An╞Top B. 
 
In fact, this Theorem of Tarski’s tells us more.  Let us define the closure Cl(X) of a set X in a 
topological space S to be the complement of the interior of the complement of X.  That is, Cl(X) = 
S – (Int (S – X)).  Let us call a topological space S dense-in-itself when, for every x  S, x  Cl(S – {x}).  
Let us call S normal when, for any two subsets X and Y of S, if Cl(X) is disjoint from Cl(Y) there exist 
disjoint open subsets U and V of S such that Cl(X)  U and Cl(Y)  V.  Let us say that S has a countable 
basis if there is a countable family U = {Ui}i  of open subsets of S such that every non-empty open subset 
of S can be represented as the union of a sub-family of U.  Finally, let us say that a topological space is 
Euclidean if it is dense-in-itself, normal, and has a countable basis.  Then Tarski (ibid.) also proved 
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(B) Where S is any given Euclidean topological space, A1,…, An├Int B if and only if 
the argument ‘A1,…, An; so B’ is valid in S. 
 
The n-dimensional Euclidean space n with its usual topology is Euclidean in the present sense. 
Although the usual basis of open balls in n is not countable, every open set in n can be represented as the 
union of a sub-family of the restricted basis comprising those open balls with rational radii and whose 
centres have rational Cartesian coordinates; this restricted basis is countable.\
9
/  In particular, then, (B) tells 
us that A1,…, An├Int B if and only if the argument ‘A1,…, An; so B’ is valid in the usual topology on the real 
line .  This result immediately shows that A  A is not a theorem of the intuitionistic sentential 
calculus and that A├ A is not a correct sequent in that calculus.  For consider a sentence letter P whose 
value v(P) in  is the open half-line (0, ).  Then v(P) = Int ( – v(P)) = Int ((, 0]) = (, 0).  Thus 
v(P  P) = v(P)  v(P) = (0, )  (, 0), so that P  P does not meet the necessary condition for 
validity, viz.   v(P  P).  To show the invalidity of A├ A, consider a sentence letter Q whose value 
v(Q) is set to be (, 0)  (0, ).  In that case, v(Q) = Int ( – v(Q)) = Int ( – ((, 0)  (0, ))) = 
Int ({0}) = .  So v(Q) = Int ( – v(Q)) = Int ( – ) = Int () = .  So the sequent Q├ Q does 
not meet the necessary condition for validity, viz. v(Q)  v(Q). 
In fact, Tarski’s proof of this Theorem may be adapted to establish corresponding results about 
monadic predicates rather than closed formulae.  Let L be a language consisting of a number of such 
predicates, formed by freely applying the predicate-forming operators ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if…then’ , and ‘not’ to a 
stock of atomic monadic predicates.  L, then, contains no singular terms or quantifiers.  Indeed, it contains 
no closed formulae: 

A and B

 is a conjunction of two monadic predicates, meaning (as it might be) ‘red and 
spherical’.  That need not stop us from applying deductive rules to the predicates in L: it makes sense to 
say, for example, that ‘red and spherical’ entails ‘red’.  Let us consider in particular the deductive system in 
which the rules of the intuitionistic propositional calculus are applied to these simple and complex monadic 
predicates, and let├Int signify deducibility by the rules of this system.  Where S is again any topological 
                                                 
9
  So, for example, in the usual topology on , the open set (0, 2) is the union of the countable collection 
of open sets (0, r), where r is a positive rational number such r
2  2. 
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space, we say that a map v is an interpretation of Linto S if v maps each predicate in L into an open subset 
of S in such a way that v(A and B) = v(A)  v(B), v(A or B) = v(A)  v(B), v(if A then B) = 
Int (v(B)  (S – v(A))), and v(not A) = Int (S – v(A)).  As before, we say that an argument ‘A1,…, An; so B’ 
in L is valid in the topological space S if and only if 
 
for every interpretation v of L into S, v(A1)  …  v(An)  S  v(B), 
 
and we define a consequence relation A1,…, An╞Top B as one which obtains when the L argument ‘A1,…, 
An; so B’ is valid in every topological space.  Then Tarski’s Second Principal Theorem also yields 
 
(A) A1,…, An├Int B if and only if A1,…, An╞Top B 
 
and 
 
(B) Where S is any given Euclidean topological space, A1,…, An├Int B if and only if 
the L argument ‘A1,…, An; so B’ is valid in S. 
 
Which of these four deliverances of Tarski’s Theorem may help to vindicate the suggestion that 
intuitionistic logic is the logic of vagueness?  The ones to look at are (A) and (B).  The intuitive idea we 
are exploring is that the extension of a vague predicate may be expected to be an open set in a suitably 
defined topology.  It is the topological interpretation of L that directly bears on that idea, not the 
interpretation of L.  We shall eventually have to return to the logic of vague statements.  Even if we could 
show that an intuitionistic system was the right logic for assessing deductions involving vague monadic 
predicates, this would not vindicate Wright’s solution to the Sorites, which requires a propositional logic, 
not merely a logic for monadic predicates.  All the same, the intuitive idea invites us to reverse the usual 
order of explanation and start by considering the logical behaviour of predicates rather than the behaviour 
of complete statements. 
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What, then, might (A) tell us about the logic of vague predicates?  It tells us that when a monadic 
predicate B is not intuitionistically deducible from some premiss predicates A1, …, An, there is some 
topological space S, and some interpretation v from L into S, for which v(A1)  …  v(An)  S is not a 
subset of v(B).  As things stand, though, we do not know that this particular topological space S is one in 
which a vague predicate has an open extension.  Theorem (A), then, is unlikely to be effective in showing 
that intuitionistic logic is the strongest logic that may legitimately be employed in deductions involving 
vague predicates.  I shall therefore explore the possibility suggested by (B)—that the standards for 
assessing such a deduction are set by some particular Euclidean space, determined by the deduction’s 
context.\
10
/ 
Given our discussion so far, certain Euclidean spaces suggest themselves as setting the standard 
for assessing deductions involving vague predicates.  Let us suppose that the atomic predicates of L are the 
colour terms ‘red’ and ‘orange’.  As we have seen, if we take the semantic values of these terms to be sets 
of precise wavelengths of light, then (a) the semantic value of each predicate in L (whether simple or 
complex) will be an open set in the natural topology on  and (b) that topology is Euclidean.  Accordingly, 
(B) tells us that the logic of L will be intuitionistic so long as the following holds: 
 
An argument ‘A1,…, An; so B’ in L is valid simpliciter if and only if it is valid in . 
 
Given the idealizations already made, this account of validity is prima facie plausible.  We are supposing 
that the semantic values of colour terms are open sets in .  Under that supposition, the conditions on v 
would appear to be faithful to the meanings of ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if…then’ and ‘not’ as these expressions connect 
predicates.  These considerations by no means establish the proposed account of validity, but they do make 
it worth exploring in detail. 
Similar considerations apply when other vague terms stand as the atomic predicates in L.  
Suppose that the atomic predicates are now ‘short’ and ‘tall’ (as applied to men).  As before, we take the 
                                                 
10
  In discussing Wright’s hypothesis in my book The Boundary Stones of Thought (Rumfitt 2015, §8.3), I 
explored only the possibility of vindicating it by way of (A).  Accordingly, the rejection of the hypothesis 
in that book was premature. 
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semantic values of these terms to be sets of real numbers, which measure men’s precise heights (in feet, 
say); a man will be tall if his precise height belongs to the value of ‘tall’.  In this case, too, (a) the semantic 
value of each predicate in L (whether simple or complex) will be an open set in the natural topology on  
and (b) that topology is Euclidean.  Given these idealizing assumptions, it is again plausible to hold: 
 
An argument in L is valid simpliciter if and only if it is valid in . 
 
It then follows from (B) that the logic of L will be intuitionistic. 
All this might encourage the following Conjecture: 
 
An argument moving from vague predicate premisses to a vague predicate conclusion is valid 
simpliciter if and only if it is valid in some particular Euclidean space. 
 
If the Conjecture were correct, then intuitionistic logic would indeed be the right logic to use in assessing 
the validity of such arguments. 
 
 
4. The Sorites Revisited 
 
Even if the semantic values of vague predicates are always open sets in a Euclidean topology, the 
Conjecture may still be false.  The Conjecture also requires that having its semantic value be an open set in 
a Euclidean topology is the strongest topological condition that may be imposed on a vague predicate.  If 
the semantic values of such predicates have to satisfy a stronger topological condition, that condition might 
well sustain a stronger-than-intuitionistic logic.  In the next section, I shall consider whether the Conjecture 
is vulnerable to objection along these lines.  On any view, however, our analysis is incomplete.  If the 
Conjecture is correct, then intuitionistic logic will set the standards for assessing deductions in which we 
move from some vague (monadic) predicates as premisses to a conclusion which also a monadic predicate.  
Intuitionistic logic, in other words, regulates such deductions as ‘Red and large; so red’.  It remains an open 
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question, however, whether that logic also regulates the paradoxical deduction of §1.  In that argument, ‘’, 
‘’, and ‘’ are all used to connect complete sentences, not predicates, and it is essential that they should 
be so used.  A step in a Sorites argument cannot be analysed as an inference from premisses saying that a 
given object has such-and-such a property, to the conclusion that the same object has some further 
property: the thrust of the Sorites is to argue for assigning a given vague property to a newly considered 
object.  So the logic to be employed in evaluating the Sorites is moot until we have extended our account of 
the meanings of ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if…then’, and ‘not’ to yield an account of the meanings of ‘’, ‘’, ‘’, and 
‘’.  We do not, however, need to extend our theory further and explain the meanings of quantified 
formulae.  Instead we can replace existentially quantified formulae such as Wright’s (10) with disjunctions 
such as (10).  In what follows, I shall write as though the deduction of §1 has been recast in just this way, 
so that it is the rule of -introduction, not -introduction, which validates the step from (5) to (6). 
How, then, might we extend our semantics for ‘and’ etc. so as to yield a semantics for ‘’ etc.?  
There is a natural way of doing this.  Consider the formula ‘a1 is red  (a2 is red)’ as an example.  That 
sentence is true if and only if the two-place predicate ‘1 is red and not (2 is red)’ is true of the ordered pair 
<a1, a2>.  Given that the semantic value V1 of ‘1 is red’ is an open set in  with its usual topology, the 
Cartesian product V1   will be an open set in 
2
 with its usual topology.  Similarly, given that the 
semantic value V2 of ‘not (2 is red)’ is an open set in  with its usual topology, the Cartesian product 
  V2 will be an open set in 
2
 with its usual topology.  So V1  V2 = (V1  )  (  V2) will be another 
open set in 2.  As noted, ‘a1 is red  (a2 is red)’ is true if and only if <a1, a2>  V1  V2.  Now in 
addition to the sentential connectives ‘’, ‘’, ‘’ and ‘’,\11/ the language L of our Sorites argument 
consists of a single atomic predicate, ‘red’, together with a hundred singular terms: ‘tube a1’,…, ‘tube a100’.  
By extending the method just indicated, we can construct, for any sentence A in L, a one-hundred place 
predicate P such that A is true if and only if P is true of <a1, …, a100>, where the semantic value of P is 
always an open set in 100 with its usual topology.  The predicate P will belong to a language whose atomic 
                                                 
11
  The particular Sorites deduction given in §1 happens not to contain ‘’ but other such deductions will 
contain the conditional, so it needs to be treated: in intuitionistic logic, ‘’ cannot be defined in terms of 
the other connectives. 
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predicates ascribe redness to various members of sequences of one hundred objects (thus one atom will say 
‘First member is red, second member is red, third member is red’), and whose only compositional devices 
are the predicate connectives ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if…then’, and ‘not’, interpreted to signify intersection, union, 
interior of relative complement, and interior of complement.  The construction is such that a deduction 
‘A1,…, An; so B’ in L is valid if and only if the corresponding deduction involving one-hundred place 
predicates, ‘B1,…, Bn; so Q’, is valid in 
100
.  100 with its usual topology is another Euclidean space.  So, 
by (B), we conclude that intuitionistic logic sets the standard for assessing deductions in L as well as for 
deductions in L. 
The method used to construct the predicates is of course inspired by Tarski’s insight that a closed 
formula in a language with quantifiers is true if and only if it is satisfied by every infinite sequence of 
objects in the domain (see Tarski 1935, 195, Definition 23).  Because, however, we are dealing with a 
language with sentential connectives, not quantifiers, we need consider only finite sequences: any 
deduction is finite and so will contain only finitely many singular terms. 
The analysis above could be applied to many Sorites deductions.  A Sorites argument for ‘tall’ 
may be analysed in essentially the same way, given that the semantic value for the monadic predicate ‘tall’ 
is another open set in .  Of course, the analysis rests on the Conjecture.  Given that, however, it provides a 
strong case for Wright’s hypothesis that intuitionistic logic regulates deductions involving vague 
predicates.  Given the master assumption that the semantic values of vague predicates are open sets, the 
semantic principles for ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if…then’, and ‘not’ are natural—indeed, they are well-nigh inevitable.  
Moreover, since  and all its finite powers provide Euclidean topologies in which many vague predicates 
have open sets as their semantic values, the analysis extends to account for the validity of deductions 
involving different sorts of vague predicate: the analysis accounts for the validity of ‘John is either rich or 
tall; John is not tall; so John is rich’ as easily as it accounts for the validity of ‘Tube a is either red or 
orange; tube a is not orange; so tube a is red’.  In defending his hypothesis, Wright can say more than that 
adopting intuitionistic logic staves off contradiction in the Paradox of Sharp Boundaries.  The semantic 
theory just sketched provides what Dummett was missing: an explanation of why intuitionistic logic is the 
right logic to use in assessing deductions involving vague predicates. 
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5. Problems for the Proposal 
 
Despite these attractive features, the suggested explanation faces problems.  The problems may not be 
insuperable, but I shall conclude by mentioning the two which seem to me to be the most serious. 
The first is that Tarski proved the Theorem on which the semantic analysis rests in a classical 
metalogic: at various points in his proof, he employs classical rules of inference that are not acceptable to 
an intuitionist.  In one respect, this casts further doubt on the thesis that classical logic provides the 
standards for assessing deductions involving vague predicates: even if we assume classical principles in the 
metalogic, the semantic theses we have been considering validate a weaker-than-classical logic for the 
object language.  In the end, though, we shall want to prove that intuitionistic logic is sound and complete 
with respect to the proposed semantics in an intuitionistic metalogic.  The thesis, after all, is that 
intuitionistic logic is the logic of vagueness, and the metalanguage in which the semantic theory is cast is 
just as vague as the object language.  The colour predicate ‘red’ is vague, but so is the metalinguistic 
predicate ‘satisfies the predicate “red”’.  I do not know whether Tarski’s Theorem—or, more particularly, 
its consequence (B)—can be proven in an intuitionistic metalogic, but this question is important for the 
vindication of Wright’s hypothesis.  The claim that intuitionistic logic is the logic of vagueness would be 
better supported if the answer were affirmative. 
The other major problem the theory faces concerns the Conjecture itself.  As I argued at the start 
of §3, it is highly plausible to claim that the semantic value of a vague predicate will be an open set in a 
suitably defined topology.  By itself, though, this claim does not sustain the Conjecture.  We also need it to 
be the case that the strongest topological condition which may be imposed on a vague predicate is that its 
semantic value should be an open set in a Euclidean topology.  There are reasons to doubt that this holds in 
general.  Indeed, there are reasons to doubt that it holds even in the particular cases we have been 
examining.  For how did we show that Excluded Middle and Double Negation Elimination were not valid 
in ?  In each case, the proofs involved assigning the subset (0, )  (, 0) of  to be the semantic value 
of either a simple or a complex predicate.  That subset is indeed an open subset of  under the usual 
topology.  One might reasonably doubt, however, whether a set such as this can really serve as the semantic 
value of a vague predicate.  Can it really be that the wavelengths of red light, for example, are those lying 
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in a certain range of a real numbers with the sole exception of a single real number lying within that range?  
The natural answer is no: our understanding of the term ‘red’ seems to preclude such a set as an admissible 
extension of the term.  It is, however, vital that such sets should be admissible extensions of predicates if 
Tarski’s proposition (B) is to hold. 
Indeed, the case suggests a stronger condition for a set to serve as the semantic value of a vague 
predicate.  Topologists call a set regular open if it is the interior of its own closure.  Any regular open set is 
open, but (0, )  (, 0) is an example of a set which is open without being regular.  The closure of 
(0, )  (, 0) is  itself, which is also the interior of the closure.  Regular open sets, then, have no 
‘cracks’ in them, and one might postulate that any admissible extension of a vague term will be regular 
open, not merely open.  Given appropriate definitions of meet, join, and complement, however, the regular 
open subsets of any topological space form a Boolean algebra.\
12
/  If the extensions of vague predicates are 
required to be regular open, and ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘not’ are interpreted using the appropriate definitions of 
meet, join, and complement, then the semantics validates the full classical logic.  The stronger topological 
requirement, then, refutes Wright’s hypothesis that intuitionistic logic is the logic of vagueness and 
therewith his solution to the Sorites. 
That stronger requirement, though, opens the way to an alternative solution to the ancient puzzle.  
As the case of (0, )  (, 0) shows, the union of two regular open sets need not be regular open.  
Accordingly, the join operation of the Boolean algebra of regular open sets is not X  Y, but Int Cl (X  Y).  
If the Boolean algebra is to validate classical logic, it is this join operation that must be assigned to interpret 
the predicate connective ‘or’ and hence the sentential connective‘’.  Under this interpretation, ‘A  B’ may 
be true even though neither A nor B is true.  Now Wright’s ‘Unpalatable Existential’ (10), viz., 
 
(10) n (an is red  (an+1 is red)), 
 
                                                 
12
  This result follows directly from the Stone Representation Theorem (Stone 1936).  Although Stone was 
the first to publish the result, Tarski liked to claim credit for it: ‘This fact was noticed by me as far back as 
1927, and was implicitly stated in Theorem B of [Tarski 1929], where, however, a different terminology 
was used’ (Tarski 1938, 449).  The interested reader may like to ponder in what sense the result in 
‘implicit’ in Theorem B of Tarski 1929; see Tarski 1983, 29. 
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is no more than the following long disjunction 
 
(10) (a1 is red  (a2 is red))  …  (a99 is red  (a100 is red)). 
 
On the alternative semantics now proposed, then, (10) may be true even though no disjunct 
‘an is red  (an+1 is red)’ is true.  Wright solves the Sorites by revising classical logic so that we do not 
reach (10) or (10).  On the alternative approach, the inference to (10) or (10) need not be resisted.  For, 
under the alternative interpretation, Wright’s ‘Unpalatable Existential’ is not really unpalatable: it does not 
ascribe a sharp boundary to the red members of the Sorites sequence. 
I developed this solution to the Sorites in Chapter 8 of The Boundary Stones of Thought (see 
Rumfitt 2015, 250f.).  I argued there that the extension of a vague predicate will be regular open whenever 
the predicate is ‘polar’ in Mark Sainsbury’s sense—that is, when its meaning is given by reference to a 
system of contrary paradigms or poles (see Sainsbury 1990).  I stand by that argument.  However, I never 
pretended to have an argument for the conclusion that every vague predicate is polar.  So I have no 
argument for the thesis that every vague predicate has a regular open extension. 
For this reason, it seems to me to be well worth exploring further the semantic theory sketched in 
§§3-4.  It seems likely that the semantic values of some families of vague predicates must be regular open, 
not merely open.  When reasoning with these predicates, we would appear to be entitled to apply all the 
rules of classical logic, so we shall need a solution to the Sorites different from Wright’s.  There is, though, 
no reason I can discern to hold that all vague predicates must have regular open sets as their semantic 
values.  Perhaps having an open set as its semantic value is the strongest general requirement that any 
vague predicate must satisfy.  If the topological space in which the set is open is Euclidean, then this 
requirement will sustain intuitionistic logic.  That logic, then, may be the strongest logic that we are entitled 
to use in reasoning with any vague predicate.  Perhaps we are entitled to use the classical logic only when 
reasoning with certain families—albeit central and common families—of vague term.  As the many 
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occurrences of ‘may be’ and ‘perhaps’ in this paragraph show, I do not know the answers to these 
questions.  I hope, though, to have indicated some promising directions for further inquiry.\
13
/ 
 
                                                 
13
   I first found myself entertaining these ideas while scribbling on whiteboards during tutorials on 
vagueness given to finalists and B.Phil. students at Oxford; I hope that on this occasion the ideas are at least 
legible.  Drafts of the paper have provided the basis for seminars and lectures at Oxford and London, and 
for talks at the Universities of Bristol and Leeds and at the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge.  I thank 
members of all my audiences for helpful questions and remarks.  I am particularly indebted to Timothy 
Williamson for written comments, and to Mark Sainsbury for his advice and encouragement. 
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